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Abstract
We examine the relationship between the short-term volatility of the effective Real
Exchange Rate (RER) and the degree of flexibility of the nominal exchange rate.
Existing evidence demonstrates that the short-term variance of bilateral RERs is on
average about 12 times higher under floating nominal exchange rate regimes than
under fixed regimes. By comparison, based on pooled results across a set of
countries with low and stable inflation and stable growth rates from 1978 to 1994,
the effective RER is only twice as volatile under floating regimes compared with
fixed regimes. Although this difference is statistically significant, results within
countries show that for most countries there was no significant increase in effective
RER volatility when moving to more flexible exchange-rate regimes. Surprisingly,
there are even some countries for which volatility is lower under more flexible
exchange-rate regimes. In part our findings reflect the fact that effective RERs are
an average of bilateral RERs. Also, we suggest that there is a difference between a
fixed exchange-rate regime during Bretton Woods and a fixed exchange-rate regime
post-Bretton Woods.
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1. Introduction
When the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in the
early 1970s, the subsequent high degree of short-term volatility in nominal exchange
rates was largely unexpected. In addition, the short-term volatility of Real Exchange
Rates (RERs) increased dramatically post-Bretton Woods. This positive relationship
between the degree of flexibility of the nominal exchange-rate regime and the
volatility of the RER is important for at least three reasons. First, the high degree of
correlation between movements in the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange
rate is consistent with the hypothesis that the prices of goods and services adjust
sluggishly relative to asset prices, such as the nominal exchange rate.1
Second, lower volatility of the RER is viewed as an advantage of fixed nominal
exchange-rate regimes over flexible regimes. In particular, lower volatility of the
RER implies greater certainty about this important relative macroeconomic price.
Third, given that the RER is a key relative price in the determination of many real
macroeconomic variables – including investment, consumption and trade flows – it
seems odd that changes in the behaviour of the RER post-Bretton Woods were not
associated with significant changes in the behaviour of these other macroeconomic
variables (Baxter and Stockman 1989).
Following the seminal work of Mussa (1986), there has been extensive literature
analysing the relationship between nominal exchange-rate regimes and the
                                        
1 The broad class of models that incorporate the assumption of price sluggishness imply that
RERs should move relatively slowly under fixed nominal exchange-rates regimes (except for
changes in official parities or realignments), while under floating exchange-rate regimes, the
RER and the nominal exchange rate should show a high degree of correlation.2
behaviour of real macroeconomic variables.2  Interest in this topic has been
heightened by a number of recent events, including currency crises (especially in
Asia) which have prompted some countries to move towards more flexible
exchange-rate regimes.  On the other hand, some countries have moved towards
more rigid nominal exchange rate arrangements, including those countries joining
the Euro bloc, while others have gone even further by establishing currency boards
(Argentina for example).
There are many studies that conclude that RERs exhibit substantially higher
short-term volatility under floating nominal exchange-rate regimes than under fixed
exchange-rate regimes.3 However, most of these studies are based on the analysis of
bilateral RERs.4 We suggest that from a macroeconomic point of view, an analysis
of the behaviour of effective RERs may be of more interest,5 and that  effective
RERs may in fact not alter their behaviour across different nominal exchange-rate
regimes.6 For example, the top panel of Figure 1 shows the monthly changes in the
bilateral RER for Denmark against the United States. The volatility in the bilateral
RER increases dramatically moving from the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates to the more flexible post-Bretton Woods era in the early 1970s.
However, such behaviour is not evident in the effective RER for Denmark shown in
the lower panel of Figure 1.7 In this paper we re-examine the effect of nominal
exchange-rate regimes on the effective RER across a large sample of countries.
                                        
2 See Frankel and Rose (1995) for a summary of this literature.
3 For example, Mussa (1986), Eichengreen (1988), Baxter and Stockman (1989), and Flood and
Rose (1995). See Obstfeld (1998) for a recent exposition of this result.
4 The IMF (1984) examined the volatility of the effective RER for seven major industrial
countries.
5 This was originally suggested by Black (1986) in his comments on Mussa (1986).
6 A country’s effective RER (also known as a multilateral RER) is the trade-weighted average of
bilateral RERs with the country’s trading partners (see Section 3).
7 As we demonstrate later in the paper there is a very slight but  statistically insignificant
increase in the variance of changes in the effective RER for Denmark post-Bretton Woods. See
Section 3 and the Appendix for a description of the data.3
Figure 1: Denmark – Monthly Bilateral and Effective RER Changes
Percentage change


























Note: The bilateral RER was based on the US dollar and the Wholesale Price Index.
It may be that the effect of averaging bilateral RERs reduces the variance of the
effective RER to such a degree that the nominal exchange-rate regime has little
impact on the volatility of effective RERs. In other words, the relationship between
the flexibility of the nominal exchange-rate regime and RER volatility may be
substantially weaker (or perhaps even insignificant) for effective RERs compared
with bilateral RERs. Such a result would have a number of implications. First, this
may help to explain why the existing studies have failed to find a significant change
in the behaviour of a range of macroeconomic variables (other than the bilateral
RER) across different nominal exchange-rate regimes. Second, the adoption of a
more flexible nominal exchange-rate regime may not be associated with greater
uncertainty with regard to the effective RER. Third, it may be that the prices of
goods and services adjust sluggishly, but much less so relative to effective nominal
exchange rates (compared with bilateral nominal exchange rates).
Implicit in the discussion above is the proposition that the effective RER is more
relevant to the behaviour of macroeconomic variables than a country’s bilateral
RERs. This would appear to be reasonable, except in a world where different firms
(and/or consumers) are sensitive to the volatility of specific bilateral exchange rates.4
However, even in this case, it may be that the effects of a depreciation of one
bilateral RER on one firm are offset by the effect of an appreciation of another
bilateral RER on another firm; if the effective RER remains unchanged, the
aggregate effect of bilateral RER changes across firms may be insignificant.
If instead, firms are affected by more than one bilateral RER then the volatility of
bilateral RERs may be less relevant to firms than the volatility of the effective RER.
A feature of many existing studies of the RER behaviour is their reliance on
comparisons of the Bretton Woods system and post-Bretton Woods in order to
delineate fixed and floating nominal exchange-rate regimes. This is problematic for
two reasons. First, there is the problem of identification – it may be that some other
event is related to a change in RER behaviour, and that this event is highly
correlated with the end of the Bretton Woods system. For example, such an event
might be the oil price shocks which led to higher volatility in energy prices and
hence, the terms of trade of many countries.8
The other problem with studies that rely on the Bretton Woods era to define fixed
exchange rates is that they may not tell us anything about fixed exchange-rate
regimes in the post-Bretton Woods era. We suggest that the RER is likely to be less
volatile during the Bretton Woods era because all countries were fixing their
nominal exchange rates. In contrast, a country with a fixed exchange-rate regime
post-Bretton Woods is fixing its exchange rate to currencies which are themselves
under floating or managed exchange-rate regimes.
In this paper we present results using a large set of countries over the period 1978 to
1994. In contrast to data sets which are centred on the end of Bretton Woods, this
data set exhibits variation in the timing of regime switches across different
countries. In addition, results based on more recent experiences of countries with
fixed exchange-rate regimes may be more relevant for policy-makers than the
experience of fixed exchange rates during Bretton Woods.
                                        
8 Alternatively, existing findings could be due to very different behaviour of the US RER during
and after Bretton Woods, with no substantial change in the behaviour of other countries’
RERs. O’Connell (1998) makes this point when talking about the time series properties of
bilateral RERs versus effective RERs.5
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we use Mussa’s sample of
16 industrialised countries to examine the volatility of the RER under fixed and
floating regimes which are identified by the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods
eras respectively. We show how the use of effective RERs in place of bilateral
RERs has an important impact on the results.
We provide a brief description of our data in Section 3 and discuss the problematic
task of classifying countries’ exchange-rate regimes. In Section 4 we present results
for the effective RER across a broad sample of countries over the period from 1978
to 1994. To make a valid determination of the effect of the nominal exchange-rate
regime, it is necessary to compare the behaviour of the RER across countries which
have similar characteristics.  It would be inappropriate to compare experiences
across extreme types of economies for which we would naturally expect different
RER behaviour irrespective of the nominal exchange-rate regime.  We chose a
subset of countries based on their inflation experience and on the variability of their
growth rates. Both of these factors are likely to influence the underlying behaviour
of the RER. Countries with high and variable inflation or variable rates of growth
also tend to exhibit high RER volatility across all nominal exchange-rate regimes.
Therefore, we concentrated our efforts on countries with both low and stable
inflation and stable growth rates.  Section 5 concludes with some remarks
concerning the interpretation of our results.
2. Re-examining Existing Evidence
In this section of the paper we show that the results of previous studies are driven
partly by their reliance on bilateral RERs. We focus on Mussa’s seminal paper by
reproducing his results, using his sample of countries and his nominal exchange rate
classification scheme, looking first at bilateral RERs and then at effective RERs.
We tested the hypothesis of no difference in the variance of monthly percentage
changes in the RER across different nominal exchange-rate regimes using F-tests.
To do this we used two different methods.  First, we assumed that for a given
exchange-rate regime, observations of monthly changes in the RER across all
countries were the result of independent draws from the same distribution.  This
assumption allowed observations of RER changes from a given regime to be pooled
across countries. In this way the relative variance of changes in the RER could be6
compared across regimes. In addition to providing a convenient summary measure
of the variance of the RER within each regime, this method was advantageous
because it allowed us to include observations from countries that had experienced
only one regime in the sample period. The disadvantage of this pooling method was
that the assumption of a single distribution may be incorrect for countries which
might have very different ‘underlying’ characteristics (and it may be impossible to
control for these differences).
For the second method, observations of RER changes were assumed to be drawn
from  distributions which varied across countries.  This justifies separate
within-country comparisons of the variance of monthly changes in the RER across
different regimes.
Mussa (1986) analysed the behaviour of bilateral RERs (versus the US dollar) of
15 industrialised countries. The Bretton Woods era was used to identify the fixed
exchange-rate regime.  He described the post-Bretton Woods period as being a
floating exchange-rate regime for these industrialised countries. His main result was
that the variance of the quarterly changes in the bilateral RERs was on average
almost 14 times higher under the floating exchange-rate regime than under the fixed
exchange-rate regimes. We replicated Mussa’s results using the two methodologies
described above for monthly bilateral RERs.9 The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates
the pooled variance of changes in the bilateral RER for each regime.10 The variance
                                        
9 The bilateral RERs were based on Consumer Price Indices. Nominal exchange rates (versus the
US dollar) were monthly averages throughout the paper (from the IMF,  International
Financial Statistics). We did not include Luxembourg in our sample. For the following
countries we followed Mussa by representing the Bretton Woods regime as the period up to
December 1970 and the post-Bretton Woods regime as the period from March 1973 onwards:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Ireland was fixed against the pound sterling until
December 1978, hence it was included in the Bretton Woods (fixed) regime up to that time and
in the post-Bretton Woods (flexible) regime after that time. Following Mussa, Canada was
included in the Bretton Woods regime from August 1962 until March 1970 and in the
post-Bretton Woods regime from April 1970 onwards. The question of transitions between
regimes was avoided here, as in Mussa, by excluding observations around the time of the
breakdown of Bretton Woods. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
10 Mussa’s original sample period was from 1957 to 1984. Our effective RERs start in 1960, and
we found it was straightforward to extend Mussa’s regime classification scheme up to
December 1990. Beyond that, Mussa’s classification scheme becomes ambiguous for many7
of bilateral RER changes was a lot higher post-Bretton Woods than during Bretton
Woods; the ratio of the pooled variances was 12 to 1.11  This difference was
significant at the 5 per cent level.
Figure 2: Variance of Monthly RER Changes
Mussa’s sample of industrialised countries




















Notes:  The bilateral RER was based on the US dollar and the CPI. The effective RER variance estimates
included the United States and placed Austria in the Bretton Woods (that is, fixed exchange rate) regime
for the full sample; likewise for Ireland until December 1978.
We also conducted F-tests on the ratio of the variances of bilateral RER changes
across nominal exchange-rate regimes within each country. All of these tests (not
reported here) conclusively indicated a higher variance under floating exchange
rates than fixed exchange rates for every country in the sample.  Therefore, the
within country results support the results of the pooled analysis, namely, that
                                                                                                                                  
European countries which dabbled with fixed exchange rates for a time (especially Sweden, the
United Kingdom and Italy).
11 The ratio of the average variance is lower than Mussa’s result due to slightly different sample
periods, the use of monthly instead of quarterly data, and slightly different regime
classifications for Ireland and Canada.8
bilateral RERs displayed systematically higher short-term volatility post-Bretton
Woods compared with during Bretton Woods.
The pooled and within-country tests were repeated on this set of countries using
effective RERs. The issue of the classification of the nominal exchange-rate regimes
was more difficult in the case of effective RERs than in the case of bilateral RERs.
For instance, the Austrian schilling was fixed against the US dollar under Bretton
Woods and then floating against the US dollar post-Bretton Woods. This is a natural
way of classifying the nominal exchange-rate regime for the purpose of examining
the behaviour of the Austrian bilateral RER (relative to the US). However, when
analysing the Austrian effective RER, it is natural to classify the nominal exchange-
rate regime as fixed both during and after Bretton Woods – that is, fixed first against
the US dollar and later fixed against the Deutsche Mark.
Mussa accounted for these problems by considering more than one bilateral RER
for a given country. In contrast, we classified countries’ exchange-rate regimes
according to whether the country was fixing its exchange rate against any major
currency and not just against the US dollar. Also, we added the US to the sample of
countries. The results from pooling countries together are shown in the right panel
of Figure 2 (a description of the data is provided in Section 3). The variance of
changes in the effective RER post-Bretton Woods was less than three times the
variance during Bretton Woods.12 This difference was significant at the 5 per cent
level, although it was clearly smaller for effective RERs than for bilateral RERs.
Results of within country F-tests are shown in Table 1. In contrast to the pooled
results, three countries, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, showed no evidence
of a significant difference in the variance of the monthly changes in the effective
RER across nominal exchange-rate regimes. (Notice that the high variance of
changes in the RER for Japan post-Bretton Woods pushed up the level of the pooled
variance – excluding Japan from the sample reduced the pooled variance
post-Bretton Woods from 2.7 to 2.5, but did not alter the result of the pooled
F-test.)
                                        
12 This was robust to using exactly the same set of countries and the same nominal regime
classifications used by Mussa (that is, as in the left panel of Figure 1).9












2 Belgium 0.39 0.68 1.77* +
3 Canada 0.07 1.11 14.83* +
4 Denmark 0.71 0.89 1.25 0
5 France 1.45 1.58 1.09 0
6 Germany 0.85 1.45 1.70* +
7 Ireland 1.11 2.16 1.95* +
8 Italy 0.38 1.54 4.03* +
9 Japan 1.08 5.38 5.00* +
10 Netherlands 0.61 0.78 1.27 0
11 Norway 0.72 1.15 1.61* +
12 Sweden 1.34 2.02 1.50* +
13 Switzerland 0.35 2.21 6.32* +
14 United Kingdom 2.46 3.95 1.61* +
15 United States 0.17 2.39 14.29* +
Notes: (a) Variances are based on monthly percentage changes in the effective RER.
(b) * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level.
(c) A positive (negative) sign indicates that the variance is significantly higher (lower) for the Bretton
Woods regime. A zero indicates no significant difference in the variance across regimes.
(d) Austria had a fixed exchange rate over the full sample period. Therefore, only one variance over the
whole sample period is reported.
In summary, the ratio of the short-term volatility of the RER under floating versus
fixed regimes was about 12 to 1 for bilateral RERs, but the ratio was less than 3 to 1
for effective RERs. Furthermore, within country tests showed that for three of the
14 countries in the sample, there was no significant difference in the short-term
volatility of the effective RER during and after Bretton Woods.13 In other words,
increased RER volatility post-Bretton Woods is no longer as conspicuous when we
consider effective RERs.
                                        
13 The IMF (1984) show that the average of month-to-month changes in the effective RER more
than doubled for France post-Bretton Woods, however, this study makes no comparison of the
variance of these short-term changes in the effective RER.10
As we mentioned above, a major problem with this sample of industrialised
countries is that most of the changes in the exchange-rate regimes occurred at the
same time (around the collapse of the Bretton Woods system). This is troubling
because it is not clear that a finding of different behaviour of the RER is due to a
change in nominal exchange-rate regimes or other contemporaneous changes in the
world economy.
In Section 4 we examine the behaviour of the effective RER across a larger set of
countries using data well after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. For this
data set, changes in nominal exchange-rate regimes were not strongly correlated
over time.
3. Data
Our data set consisted of 90 countries with monthly data on the effective RER,
nominal exchange-rate regimes and inflation rates over the period 1978 to 1994.14
Also, we used annual data on real GDP to calculate the variance of real GDP
growth rates.
We used data from Goldfajn and Valdes (1996) on monthly effective RERs,
available from January 1960 to December 1994. The effective RER is a
trade-weighted average of bilateral RERs with those trading partners encompassing
4 per cent or more of trade in either imports or exports. In the construction of these
bilateral RERs, the Wholesale Price Index was used if available; otherwise the
Consumer Price Index was used.
We built our data set on nominal exchange-rate regimes from the monthly issues
(October 1978 to November 1996) of the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and from the Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions also of the IMF (1978 to 1983). The raw
data on regimes describes over 25 possible exchange rate arrangements. We
simplified this classification scheme by aggregating categories into three broad
groupings (see Appendix for details). The fixed exchange-rate regime included pegs
                                        
14 Quarterly data was available for two additional countries, New Zealand and Papua New
Guinea.11
to single currencies and pegs to the SDR or other baskets. The second regime
allowed for some flexibility in the nominal rate and included countries in the
European Monetary System (EMS), pegs which are adjusted frequently and
managed floating rates. The third regime consisted of freely floating exchange rates.
In practice, these three groups represent relative degrees of flexibility rather than
precise distinctions. For expositional purposes, we refer to these regimes as fixed,
managed and floating exchange-rate regimes.
Our broad classification scheme is similar to that adopted by the IMF. It differs from
Mussa by differentiating between managed and floating exchange-rate  regimes
which he had combined into a single group. The other difference is due to our focus
on effective RERs. For example, as already mentioned in our classification scheme,
Austria was fixed to a major currency until 1990 and so it was included in the fixed
exchange-rate regime throughout this period.
The accuracy of our classification scheme depends partly on the accuracy of the
information that member countries submit to the IMF. The IMF attempts to assess
the accuracy of this information and on occasion shifts countries into nominal
exchange-rate regime categories accordingly.
Ideally, the classification of the nominal exchange-rate regime should be based on a
country having in place a broad set of policies which are consistent with a given
regime. However, on occasion, a country will claim to be in a given regime but run
policies which are inconsistent with this regime. For example, a country with very
high inflation that attempts to be in a fixed regime, but does nothing other than
switch to a fixed regime in order to control inflation, is unlikely to be able to hold a
fixed peg for an extended period. Therefore, such a country will display a highly
variable RER (and nominal exchange rate) simply because the peg has to be
devalued in large discrete steps in order to prevent sustained appreciations of the
RER. In practical terms, such a country is not genuinely in a fixed exchange-rate
regime. We addressed this problem by examining a subset of countries with low and12
stable inflation and stable growth rates that were most likely to be accurately
classified in terms of their exchange-rate regimes.15
4. New Evidence
We examined the variance of monthly percentage changes in the effective RER
across three possible nominal exchange-rate regimes for the period November 1978
to December 1994. We arrived at our preferred set of results in a number of stages.
In the first stage we derived the pooled results for the full sample of countries. In the
second stage we dealt with the problem associated with observations close to
regime transitions. We elected to remove three monthly observations on either side
of regime switches and maintained this refinement thereafter. In further stages we
eliminated countries from the sample until we were left with a preferred sub-sample
of countries with low and stable inflation and stable growth experiences; at this final
stage we derived both pooled and within-country results.
Stage 1: Full Sample
The results for the full sample of countries using the pooled analysis are shown in
row (1) of Table 2. The pooled variance of effective RER changes was substantially
higher under the floating exchange-rate regime than the fixed and managed
exchange-rate regimes (389 versus 113 and 86 respectively). However, the variance
under all regimes appears to be high, in part because of large and infrequent changes
in nominal exchange  rates which were associated with switches in nominal
exchange-rate regimes.
                                        
15 Also, for reasons that we do not fully understand, many developing countries (which also have
high inflation) report their regimes as floating when they clearly are not.13










1 Full sample of 90 countries







2 Full sample of 90 countries







3a Sample of 45 high inflation countries
– inflation more than 10 per cent per annum







3b Sample of 45 low inflation countries
– inflation less than 10 per cent per annum







4 Sample of 27 low and stable inflation and
stable growth rate countries
– inflation less than 10 per cent per annum
– standard deviation of annual growth less
  than 4.5 per cent
– standard deviation of monthly inflation
  less than 1.5 per cent







Notes: Figures in parentheses are the number of observations that pertain to each pooled variance.
Stage 2: Regime Switching
Regime switches often involve large movements in both the nominal exchange rate
and the RER. These transitions were problematic because it was not clear whether
these movements were associated with the new or the old regime (or simply because
the regime was in transition). Indeed, a large depreciation may take place at the
onset of a flexible regime but may in fact be a correction of a significant
overvaluation that occurred during the fixed exchange-rate regime. We controlled
for this problem by deleting the last three months at the end of an old regime and the
first three months at the beginning of a new regime. Row (2) of Table 2 shows the
pooled results with this correction. Compared with the results in the first row, the
short-term volatility of the effective RER was substantially lower for all regimes,
especially for the floating exchange-rate regime (which is consistent with the14
example of regime switching mentioned above). All of the results that follow in the
paper are based on this correction for regime switching.16
Stage 3: High and Low Inflation Countries
We divided the sample of countries between those with high inflation and those with
low inflation; we used a cut-off rate of 10 per cent per annum averaged over the
sample.17 This helped to account for systematic differences across country types
that might be relevant to the behaviour of the RER but not necessarily related to the
nominal exchange-rate regime.18 The results shown in rows (3a) and (3b) of Table 2
confirm our suspicion that high inflation countries had much greater RER volatility
than low inflation countries. We concentrated the rest of our analysis on the set of
low inflation countries.
For the set of low inflation countries, the managed and floating exchange-rate
regimes displayed significantly lower RER volatility than the fixed exchange-rate
regime (2.4 and 3.4 compared with 20). This apparently perverse result may reflect
the fact that many countries that experienced the fixed exchange-rate regime had
low average inflation but highly variable inflation and highly variable growth rates,
which should have increased the volatility of the RER for these countries.19
Stage 4: Countries with Low and Stable Inflation and Stable Growth Rates
Figure 3 shows the standard deviation of inflation and growth rates for the set of
low inflation countries. We chose to exclude from our sample of low inflation
countries those countries with either a standard deviation of growth greater than
                                        
16 Although we do not consider it in this paper, the behaviour of the RER at the time of regime
switches is often dramatic and is one way in which the nominal exchange-rate regime may in
fact have important implications for the RER and the economy in general.
17 Inflation rates were calculated as monthly changes in the CPI (or the WPI when the CPI was
unavailable) from the IFS.
18 This is also a useful distinction because the regime classification scheme is likely to be more
accurate for low inflation and more developed economies (as mentioned in Section 3).
19 This volatility must reflect greater instability both in terms of external shocks, such as the terms
of trade, and internal shocks such as changes in domestic policy settings. Most of these
countries are members of the CFA African Franc Zone, which experienced a very substantial
real and nominal devaluation in January 1994 (Savvides 1996).15
4.5 per cent or a standard deviation of inflation greater than 1.5 per cent (that is,
those countries shown in the upper and right quadrants of Figure 3).
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Notes: These calculations were based on monthly inflation and annual growth of real GDP. Real GDP data was
from the Summers and Heston database in the Mark 5.6 version of the Penn World Tables.
The results of the effective RER volatility for 27 low and stable inflation and stable
growth countries are shown in row (4) of Table 2. The ratio of the pooled variance
of percentage changes in the effective RER during the floating exchange-rate regime
compared with the fixed exchange-rate regime was 1.9 to 1. This difference was
significant at the 5 per cent level. The short-term volatility of the effective RER
during the managed float regime lay in between the other regimes (and was
significantly different from both of these regimes).
The pooled results suggest that the effective RER displays greater volatility under
more flexible nominal exchange-rate regimes, consistent with earlier findings based
on bilateral RERs. However, the within country results in Table 3 show that there
was no systematic difference in the short-term volatility of the effective RER across
nominal exchange-rate regimes. Within the sample of 27 countries with low and16
stable inflation and stable growth rates, there were 17 countries which experienced
more than one regime over the sample period. Of these countries, only five had
significantly more volatile effective RERs under more flexible exchange-rate
regimes. Two countries displayed significantly lower RER volatility under more
flexible regimes. Ten countries displayed no significant difference in the short-term
volatility of the effective RER.













1 Australia 1.60 6.48 4.04* +
2 Canada 1.14 0.95 1.19 0
3 Finland 1.26 3.42 2.72* +
4 India 4.94 1.08 4.58* –
5 Italy 0.66 2.72 4.15* +
6 Japan 6.74 4.95 1.36 0
7 Korea 1.15 1.61 1.40 0
8 Morocco 1.54 2.38 1.55* +
9 New Zealand
(d) 1.46 1.10 1.10 0
10 Norway 0.92 0.51 1.80* –
11 Pakistan 2.94 2.91 1.01 0
12 Singapore 0.66 0.68 1.03 0
13 Spain 1.71 1.01 1.69 0
14 Sweden 1.89 3.65 1.94* +
15 Thailand 1.85 2.42 1.31 0
16 United Kingdom 3.68 3.68 1.00 0
17 United States 2.37 1.79 1.33 0
Notes: (a) Variances were based on monthly percentage changes in the effective RER.
(b) * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level.
(c) A positive (negative) sign indicates that the variance is significantly higher (lower) for the Bretton
Woods regime. A zero indicates no significant difference in the variance across regimes.
(d) For comparative purposes, the quarterly percentage changes for NZ were converted to the equivalent
monthly changes.17
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have re-examined the relationship between nominal exchange-rate
regimes and the short-term volatility of the real exchange rate (RER). Our paper has
incorporated two innovations. First, we focused our attention on the effective RER
(as opposed to the bilateral RER used in previous studies of this type). We
presented results for a set of industrialised countries, using the Bretton Woods and
post-Bretton Woods eras to distinguish between fixed and floating exchange-rate
regimes respectively. Like earlier studies, the variance of monthly percentage
changes in the effective RER was significantly higher under the more flexible
exchange-rate regime of the post-Bretton Woods period. However, whereas the
short-term volatility of bilateral RERs increased about 12 fold post-Bretton Woods,
for effective RERs the increase was just less than three fold (based on results
pooled across all countries). Using within country analysis, for bilateral RERs this
increase was of the same order of magnitude and statistically significant for all
countries, however, in the case of effective RERs, there was no significant increase
in volatility for three of the 14 countries in the sample.
The second innovation of our paper was to examine results based on a larger sample
of countries using more recent monthly data on nominal exchange-rate regimes
compiled from IMF records. Three broad regime classifications were identified –
fixed, managed and floating. This data set had the advantage of significant variation
in the timing of regime switches across different countries.
We focused our efforts on a group of 27 countries which experienced low and stable
inflation and stable growth over the sample period (1978 to 1994). The results of
pooling observations across countries, within regimes, implied that the short-term
volatility of the effective RER under floating exchange-rate regimes was almost
double the volatility under fixed exchange-rate regimes. This difference was
statistically significant. However, the results from the within country analysis
suggest that the relationship, if any, between the volatility of the effective RER and
the nominal exchange-rate regime is quite weak. The within-country results are
more appropriate than the pooled analysis if the behaviour of the RER is influenced
by characteristics which vary across countries (although we attempted to control for
some of these differences by restricting our sample to countries with common
inflation and growth experiences).18
There were 17 countries with low and stable inflation and stable growth rates, which
had experienced more than one regime since 1978. Of these, only five displayed
significantly greater short-term volatility of the effective RER under more flexible
exchange-rate regimes. Twelve countries displayed no significant increase in the
short-term volatility of the effective RER under more flexible regimes. Two of these
countries actually displayed significantly lower volatility under more flexible
regimes.
Our finding is not inconsistent with earlier findings which show that bilateral RERs
are more volatile under floating exchange-rate regimes. First, a country’s effective
RER typically has lower variance than most of its component bilateral RERs.
Second, it seems plausible that the nature of the fixed exchange-rate regime of the
Bretton Woods system may differ from that of a fixed exchange-rate regime
post-Bretton Woods. The variance of the effective RER under fixed exchange rate
arrangements may depend on the extent to which major trading partners are also in a
fixed exchange-rate regime. In other words, the fixed exchange-rate regime during
Bretton Woods is quite likely to result in lower variance of the effective RER than
the fixed exchange-rate regime post-Bretton Woods.20 However, as our data set
stands, there are almost no countries which are in the fixed exchange-rate regime
both during and after Bretton Woods and are fixed to a single currency. The few
that we can clearly identify as remaining fixed post-Bretton Woods also
simultaneously went from fixed to the US dollar to fixed to a basket of currencies –
and experienced a fall in their effective RER volatility post-Bretton Woods.21
One potential bias in our estimates of RER volatility comes about because we have
excluded observations near to regime transitions. If anything, we feel that we have
underestimated the volatility of the RER under the fixed exchange-rate regime
because most of the changes in RERs at the time of regime transitions are probably
due to fixed exchange rates (we leave this to further research).
                                        
20 Our results are consistent with this idea, although the comparison must necessarily be across a
different set of countries over the two periods. The variance of monthly changes in the
effective RER was 0.98 for the pooled sample of 16 industrialised countries during Bretton
Woods. The pooled result for fixed exchange-rate regimes after 1978, based on a set of
countries with low and stable inflation and stable growth rates, was 1.71.
21 To investigate this issue more carefully would require an extension of our regime classification
back to at least 1973.19
Higher volatility of bilateral RERs under more flexible exchange-rate regimes has
been explained in the past as being due to higher volatility of nominal exchange
rates, combined with sluggish adjustment of prices. Our result does not discount this
explanation – it may be that volatility across a range of bilateral nominal exchange
rates is averaged out considerably when constructing effective real exchange rates.
However, there is an alternative interpretation of our findings. It may be that
countries choose nominal exchange-rate regimes in order to minimise RER
volatility; that is, the choice of nominal exchange-rate regimes may be
endogenous.22 If this is the case, it may be difficult to find evidence of a systematic
relationship between the nominal exchange-rate regime and effective RER volatility
across all countries, even though the nominal exchange-rate regime may influence
the volatility of the effective RER.
                                        
22 For a discussion of this topic see Edwards (1996).20
Appendix: Nominal Exchange-rate Regimes
Table A1 indicates how the many different nominal exchange-rate regimes
described by the IMF are aggregated into our three broad groupings. Our data on
nominal regimes starts in November 1978 and ends in December 1994.
Table A1: Nominal Exchange Regimes – IMF Descriptions
Description Regime
1 pegged to US dollar Fixed
2 pegged to Pound Sterling Fixed
3 pegged to French Franc Fixed
4 pegged to Spanish Peseta Fixed
5 pegged to South African Rand Fixed
6 pegged to Australian Dollar Fixed
7 pegged to Indian Rupee Fixed
8 pegged to Deutsche Mark Fixed
9 pegged to Russian Rouble Fixed
10 pegged to Italian Lira Fixed
11 pegged to Ethiopian Birr Fixed
12 pegged to Singapore Dollar Fixed
13 pegged to SDR Fixed
14 pegged to other (currency) composite Fixed
15 exchange rate adjusted according to set of indicators Managed
16 cooperative exchange rate arrangements Managed
17 other, split into 3 categories as of 31 July 1982 *
18 flexibility limited in terms of a single currency Managed
19 more flexible: other managed floating Managed
20 more flexible: independently floating Floating
Notes: *Category 17 is simply denoted ‘other’ in the IFS prior to 31 July 1982. For dates prior to this we
used information from the IMF  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, to dissagregate category 17 into categories 18, 19 and 20 shown above. More detailed
information is available on request.21
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